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COORDINATION OP DEVELOPMENT PLANS IN EAST AFRICA 
"by 
Paul Clark 
I. Studying the Possibilities of Co-ordination 
Supporters of closer political and economic relations 
among the three East African countries commonly cite as one of 
the main objectives co-ordination of development plans. More 
vigorous economic development than In the recent past is 
clearly a hey social goal, and the presumption that there are 
mutually "beneficial ways of co-ordinating the three countries' 
development efforts is" a. reasonable one. It therefore appears 
quite relevant to examine the present course of development 
plans in the region, and to seek to identify specific fields 
of planning where co-ordination is likely to "be most beneficial. 
The development programs of the three East African 
governments are now proceeding sjuite independently. Uganda 
has a .five year plan covering the fiscal year 1961/62-1956/66, 
and is in the midst of implementing It, subject to considerable 
financial constraints. Tanganyika Is now completing the final 
year of a three-year plan, and is in the process of drafting a 
new five-year plan covering the fiscal years 1964/65-1958/69, 
using a quite elaborate methodology. Kenya is operating under 
a one-year extension of the last three-year plan, and is in the 
process of preparing a new three-year plan for the period 
1964-/65-1966/67 and a tentative outline plan for a further 
three-year period. • There has been little consultation among 
the three planning staffs. 
At the"same time some of the most important economic 
policies which influence the path of economic development in 
the three countries are kept essentially uniform because of 
the de facto common market. This applies to the level and 
structure of business taxation, which might be a key instrument 
of industrialization policy; to rates of customs duty, by 
to monetary and 
;ommon currency 
now 
which protection policies are implemented 
credit policies, now operated through the 
board; and to Investment in railways and communications, 
operated as common services. These essentially uniform 
economic policies are co-ordinated through a variety of 
intergovernmental channels under the general aegis of EACSO, 
but it is notable that there is little direct connection 
between the present development plans of the three governments 




The gap between separate development plans and essentially 
uniform economic- policies for the common market is both a 
source of op port-unity and a source of tension. On the. one 
hand, attempts to make development plans more comprehensive 
and more energetic seem bound"to lead to explicit consideration 
of how to employ more effectively the common economic 
On the other hand, there is already considerable discontent 
with t-he constraints of the common market, particularly in 
Uganda and Tanganyika, and increasingly independent development 
actions by all three governments pose a threat to continuation 
-of. S.VM th.e nr>A29ni degree of economic integration in East 
he gap between plans and policies needs- to 
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a piece of a continuing study of 
ivelopment plans In East Africa, The study 
- set of interrelated studies on East African 
J' problems being undertaken by participants _ u 
=Economic Development Research Project, 
' /My 
My particular study lias three main objectivesi (a) to 
compare the current development programs of the three East 
African governments, (To) to analyse the relationships 
between ciu^rent development programs and recent economic 
trends in the three countries, (To) to identify possibilities 
for mutual assistance in the development programs, includ-
ing joint financing. 
The first step in the study is simply to describe in 
detail the current development programs of the three govern-
ments, _ 'The idea is to start with the plans and proceed 
to the budget documents indicating current actions under the 
plans. In the case of Tanganyika and Kenya, the immediate 
fo cus will be on the plans being completed, but it will be 
important to introduce indications of the lines of future 
plans as they become available. It will also be necessary 
to' examine EACSO Investment expenditures. The aspects of 
the programs which I expect will be of greatest interest are 
the followings (a) the strategy and methodology employed In 
drawing up the plan; (b) the size of the plan as an annual 
rate in comparison with various indicators of the size of the 
economy; (c) the composition of the plan by economic sector, 
and the 'detailed composition of planned expenditures within 
some of the main sectors; (d) the expected pattern of 
financing, in particular distinguishing domestic sources and 
foreign soLirces; (e) the actual development expenditures 
under the plan, both in total and in relation to the 
composition by economic sector, and the actual pattern of 
financing. 
Section II of the present paper describes and compares 
the current development plans of Uganda and Tanganyika. 
This essentially descriptive section is a little bare without 
Kenya and without an analysis of how the plans relate to 
recent economic trends in the two countries. However, 
several suggestive points about plan co-ordination emerge, 
and in addition I hope the description of the plans will be 
of interest In its own right. 
Section III of the paper offers certain hypotheses about 
promising lines for future plan co-ordination, derived partly 
from broader considerations. Naturally at this stage in 
the study the hypotheses cannot be considered anything like 
conclusions, but I hope they will be stimulating to consider. 
II. Comparison of Current Uganda and Tanganyika Plans 
A.' Nature and Method 
Both the Uganda and the Tanganyika plans (see Tables 1 
and 2) are public project plans, in two different senses. 
In the first place, their scope consists of expenditures by 
the central government and public agencies. The share of 
public agencies is much larger in Uganda, because of the 
role played by the Uganda Development Corp., the Uganda 
Electricity Board, and the Uganda Credit and Savings Bank. 
But the relevant point is that in both plans private investment 
is for all practical purposes not included, except for 
expected private participation in public projects. There 
is a chapter in the Uganda plan about private investment 
intentions, but the survey on which it is based was experi-
mental, and the main thing it reveals is the common pattern 
of declining investment plans for years further in the future. 
There is only a historical discussion of private investment 
in the Tanganyika plan, and it is simply assumed that private 
Investment will continue as in the past. Neither plan sets 
targets for private economic activity; an exception is the 
Uganda objective of raising cotton production from 370,000 
to 500,000 bales. 
In the second place, the method of constructing 
both plans was pretty clearly that of selecting and 
adding together the.projects which appears to be 
most promising within a rough estimate of the amount 
which might possibly be financed. There was no 
explicit analysis of a set of desired developments 
in the economy as a whole from which, the development 
program.itself was derived. It Is true that both 
plans took advantage of broad economic surveys under-
taken by visiting IBRD missions, and employed economic 
analyses in selecting promising projects. The Uganda 
plan estimated by two rough methods that the overall 
development effort would result In expanding gross 
domestic product somewhere between 3-fc® and 5/° per 
year; the Tanganyika plan essentially projected 
continuation of the past rate of growth of about 5f° 
per year. Thus in both plans the method was clearly 
not that of comprehensive planning. 
These points should not be Interpreted 8L S 3j 
sharp criticism of the current plans, in view of the 
manifold practical difficulties of carrying through 
comprehensive planning of major private' as well as 
public activities. But they do suggest that future 
plans are likely to be more ambitious in scope and 
method. It is noteworthy that the new Tanganyika 
plan now being drafted does attempt to indicate growth 
perspectives to 1970 and 1980, into which planned 
public projects ought to fit. The Tanganyika 
government has also initiated quite extensive formal 
procedures for consultation with private producers. 
I would expect more comprehensive development planning 
approaches to be attempted in all three East African 
countries in the next few years. This trend should 
increase interest in co-ordination of the implications 
of more comprehensive plans. 
B. Size 
The Uganda development plan (see Table l) 
envisions total development expenditures of £67.9 
million over the five fiscal years 1961/62 to 1965/66. 
Since the main decisions affecting the plan were made 
after the first fiscal year was completed and while 
the second was in progress, there is some difficulty 
in interpreting the five-year total. Taking a simple 
average, however, this implies an annual rate of expenditure 
of about £13.6 million, which is about 12$ of the 1962 level 
of monetary gross domestic product. Thus considered simply 
as a total, the'plan represents a substantial development 
effort, 
The current Tanganyika plan (see Table 2) envisions 
total development expenditures of £30.8 million over the 
three fiscal years 1961/62 to 1963/64. This implies an 
average annual rate of expenditure of about £10.3 million 
which is between 8ft and 9 o f the 1962 monetary gross 
domestic product. The impression that the total Tanganyika 
development effort is distinctly smaller than the Uganda 
plan is misleading, however, due to the fact that the Uganda 
Development Oorp. are not counted because they are in private 
hand s. 
The planned central government expenditures are more 
nearly comparable. The Uganda plan implies an annual rate 
of expenditure of about £7.8 million, or ifo of recent 
monetary gross domestic product. The Tanganyika plan 
implies annual expenditures of about £8.4 million, also 
lio of recent monetary gross domestic product. Looked at 
from another standpoint, planned annual development 
expenditures are about 3 8 o f the 1962/63 level of recurrent 
expenditures in Uganda, about 36/= in Tanganyika. Finally, 
both plans project annual development expenditures about 
half again the average level actually attained in the 
preceding three fiscal years. Thus for all practical 
purposes the two central government plans are about the same 
size in relation to the respective national economices. 
In interpreting these figures it may be noted that a 
small amount of additional recurrent expenditures is 
explicitly charged to the development budget In both 
countries. In Uganda these are defined as the recurrent 
costs of development projects in commodity-producing sectors 
and in secondary education; Tanganyika's practice is not 
so clearly stated but appears to be similar. Beyond these 
designed recurrent expenditures, however, it should be kept 
in mind that many of the designated capital expenditures 
are really non-recurrent operating costs rather than fixed 
capital formation. In Uganda, for instance, half of the 
capital expenditures in agriculture are the costs of the 
cotton spraying subsidies scheme, and almost half of the 
capital expenditures for administration are overhead costs 
of the Ministry of work in carrying out construction projects. 
This practice of charging some recurrent costs to develop-
ment is quite proper, but it means that the content of 
central government development expenditures is rather 
different from the content of capital expenditures by 
public agencies or private enterprises. 
It may also be noted that the new Tanganyika plan seems 
likely to be substantially larger in size than the current 
one. The strategy which the planning staff have been 
following is to sketch more ambitious long-run growth 
perspectives, to urge ministries and other organizations 
proposing projects to raise their sights, and to assume that 
more attractive projects within a cogent plan will call 
forth the necessary finance. 
C. Composition 
Both plans project expenditures in a wide range of 
economic sectors (see Table 3). This broad distribution 
presumably stems partly from the methodology of the plan, • 
assembling public projects presented by the various ministries 
and public agencies, and partly from the phenomenon that 
projects which are attractive in an absolute sense can be 
discovered in all sectors of a less developed economy. 
Some significant differences in emphasis among major 
sectors can be discerned, however. The most striking 
difference in the figures in Table 3 is the much larger 
Uganda expenditures- for manufacturing ahd for agricultural 
estates (2840 as against 359). Since these figures stem 
from the special role of the UDC, as discussed above, they 
do not necessarily imply greater investment in these sectors 
in the Uganda economy as a whole, but they do reflect greater 
direct public activity to promote manufacturing and large-
scale agriculture. Another notable difference is that 
Tanganyika.has planned expenditures nearly half again as 
large for electric power and roads (3398 compared to 2336). 
A third is that Uganda intends to devote between a quarter 
and a third more to education and health (1795 compared to 
1408). Thus the difference in choice In Tanganyika and 
Uganda between economic overheads and social investment is 
substantial. • : 
/She 
The'detailed composition of expenditures within each 
sector also reveals some interesting aspects of the 
development policies to be piirsued. Thus within agriculture 
broadly defined (see Table 4), the most notable point in the 
Uganda plan is that almost half of the expenditures are to 
go Into estate development under the aegis of the JDC, This 
implicit judgment that the economic returns from estates are 
relatively high in the present predominantly peasant 
agriculture Is striking. The fact that the next largest 
activity is the cotton spraying subsidy scheme is also notable 
as this scheme represents a major effort to up-grade the 
technological level of peasant cotton culture throughout the 
country by Introducing relatively simple non-agricultural 
inputs. Its success or failure will be either very 
encouraging or very discouraging for the prospect of raising 
general agricultural productivity at a rapid rate in the 
future. Next, the amount of expenditure allocated to 
promoting the use of agricultural equipment is four times that 
in Tanganyika. Finally, Uganda seems.to be wagering much 
more on tsetse control as a means of raising livestock 
production. On the other hand, Tanganyika has planned to 
place relatively greater stress on training agricultural 
staff, on general extension as distinguished from specific 
crop development programs, and on Irrigation and land develop-
ment works. These differences In agricultural development 
policies are in part reactions to different objective condition 
(e.g. Tanganyika's greater aridity). But they are also in 
part results of different subjective judgments by agriculture 
officials. They constitute in effect a set of experiments, 
the results of which in each country should be of keen 
interest to the other. 
Within manufacturing, all the projects In the Uganda plan 
are to be organized by the UDC. The major projects, ranked 
approximately in order of cost, are expected to be paper, 
textiles, food and drink (five different plants), and some 
among the followings fertilizers, steel, matchesagricultural 
equipment, and oils. The Tanganyika expenditures, on the 
other hand, are devoted to setting up the Tanganyika Develop-
ment Corp., which is expected to play a somewhat similar 
leading role In promoting manufacturing projects, and to 
preparing industrial sites. Without more explicit planning 
of individual projects in both countries, It Is hardly 
possible to consider closer co-ordination of manufacturing 
plans, even though this sector is one in which potential 
gains appear most attractive. 
Finally, the composition of development expenditures in 
education (see Table 5) reflects In both countries acceptance 
of the policy of giving highest priority to expansion at the 
secondary level. In Uganda nearly two-thirds of the total 
Is devoted to secondary schools. Whereas for primary 
schools the stated objective is simply to bring'up the 
enrollment rates in all regions to the present national 
average of 50f°, the goal for secondary schools is to raise 
the enrollment rate from to 4% of the age group. In 
Tanganyika nearly half of the total is devoted to"secondary 
schools, and the stated goal is to increase the number of 
school certificates three times and the number of higher 
school certificates six times. ~ The expenditure in 
Tanganyika is held down, however, by the competing claim ' 
for expansion of university-level education. 
D. .financing and Comparison with IBRD Mission Recommendations 
Both the Tanganyika plan and the Uganda plan .were adopted 
subsequent-to reports by -visiting IBRD missions, and were 
clearly much influenced by the-mission recommendations. 
There are of course some differences in the composition of 
development expenditures in the official plans and in the 
mission recommendations, presumably reflecting in general 
differences in the complex of objectives being pursued. Prom 
the standpoint of financing, however, the significant point 
is that both plans are larger than the missions suggested, 
and hence require additional sources of funds. 
In Uganda the official plan /projects total central 
government expenditures about 15^ larger than the mission 
program (see Table 6). This moderate difference in total 
financing conceals a major difference in views about domestic 
and foreign sources, however. The mission projected about 
40fo more from domestic sources, in particular from taxation 
and from drawing down previously accumulated funds, while the 
plan projects about 50% more from foreign sources, including 
the balance not covered. With respect to domestic fiscal 
policy, the mission recommended more stringent action in two 
different directions than the government felt able to accept, 
at least at the time the plan was drafted. One was to lower 
marketing board prices for cotton and coffee to the export 
level, and to use much of the remaining balances in the price 
assistance funds for the development budget. The other was 
to introduce still further tax revisions, both to provide tax 
revenues for the development budget and to Increase Invest-
ment incentives. With respect to foreign grants and loans, 
a government is almost bound to be more ambitious than an 
IBRD mission, some excess of optimism is almost surely 
desirable, since the amount of foreign financial assistance 
is not pre-determined, but is likely to vary with the 
attractiveness and demonstrated urgency of the development 
projects proposed. On the basis of experience to date, 
however, (see section E), the plan does appear to be over-
optimistic 0 
The difference between the official plan and the mission 
program is even larger for public agencies outside the 
central government, particularly the UDC. The mission 
projected total UDC finance of £7-5 million, Including 
borrowing, of which 7»0 might be used for projects in 
agricultural estates, manufacturing, commerce, tourism, and 
mining, and 0.5 might be paid as a divident to the central 
government development budget. The government plan projects 
total UDC finance of £15.4 million, made up of 7.2 from 
operating surpluses, 2.7 from foreign loans in negotiation, 
2.8 from private participation, and 4.2 not yet covered; all 
of these funds are assumed to be available for development 
projects. This is a dramatic difference In financial expectat-
ions, which only time will test. A substantial shortfall would 
hardly be surprising, hoy/ever. 
In Tanganyika the official plan projects total central 
government expenditures a third larger than the mission program 
(see Table 7). The additional financing required is assumed 
to come half from further domestic sources, however, and half 
from foreign sources. Thus the Tanganyika government has been 
more optimistic than the mission about total financing, but the 
difference has not been so sharply focused on foreign sources 
as in Uganda. In the event (see section E), Tanganyika's 
greater total financing has come mainly from domestic sources. 
/E 
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E. Actual Expenditures and Revenues to Date 
Actual central government expenditures for development 
during the first two fiscal years have fallen below the 
average annual-rates implicit in the plan in both countries 
(see Tables 8-and 9)s but the shortfall has been relatively-
greater'in Uganda. After adjusting for a definitional 
difference in the way actual expenditures are reported, the 
Uganda plan implies average .annual expenditures of £7.9 
million. Actual expenditures in 1951/62. (presumably 
determined prior to the plan) were 4«o, and revised 
estimates for 1962/63 (presumably guided by drafts of- the 
plan) were 5.7. The trend is upward, but though a much 
higher expenditure figure has been officially estimated 
for 1963/64, the amount of financing available and unavoidable 
administrative constraints- suggest that the ultimate figure 
is not likely to exceed-7.5. Thus the average annual rate 
in the first three years is not likely to be more than 6.0, 
compared to the pre-plan average of something less than 5.4. 
In-Tanganyika, actual expenditures in 1961/62, though 
still behind the plan, reached the substantial figure of 
£7.3 million. In 1962/63, lack of finance compelled the 
government t o introduce a freeze on starting new projects, 
and the revised estimate for the year is about 6.0. 
Bolstered by some financing windfalls, the government has 
budgeted over twice as much for 1963/64, but with some 
foreign loans still in negotiation, and considering the 
administrative problems of implementing such an abrupt 
change, a more plausible estimate is 9-10. This would still 
constitute an average annual rate over the three years of 
the plan of about 7.6, compared to the pre-plan average of 
something more than 5.4. The momentum, of higher 
expenditures would doubtless also carry over into the new 
plan. 
The pattern of shortfalls by economic sectors allowing 
for the fact that 1963/64 initial estimates are probably 
exaggerated in both countries is also rather interesting. 
In Uganda data are available only by individual ministries, 
but an indication of the locus of shortfalls by sectors can 
be obtained. Certain ministries have been making 
expenditures at rates at least equal to the plans Health, 
and Prime Minister, Justice, and Finance (administration). 
Some other ministries have had shortfalls, but have increased 
expenditures so sharply that they- seem likely to equal or 
exceed the plan overall; Education, Information., and Internal 
Affairs (defence and police). Still other ministries, 
after earlier shortfalls, have increased expenditures to 
around the planned rate but not yet enough to compensate 
for the shortfalls; Agriculture, Animal Industry, Mineral 
and Water Resources, and Community Development and Labour, 
Finally, some ministries have had large shortfalls already 
and seem likely to fall below the plan overalls Works 
(largely roads), and Regional-Administrations (assistance 
to local governments). Thus broadly speaking administrative 
and social development expenditures appear to be proceeding 
more nearly according to plan than directly productive 
and economic overhead expenditures. 
Three sectors in the Tanganyika plan are likely to 
exceed planned targets significantly, in each case as a 
consequence of revised policies while the plan has been in 
operation; community development (a prominent political 
as well as economic theme), manufacturing (enlargement of 
the Tanganyika Development Corp. with foreign loans), and 
tourism (the Dar es Salaam hotel as a public project). 
/A 
- 8 -
A number•of sectors seem' likely to reach planned totals or end 
up only moderately below them; agriculture broadly defined, 
electric power, education, information, administration, and 
local government services,• Finally, significant overall 
shortfalls seem'likely in roads, mining and mapping, health, 
and defence and police. While the increases are readily 
explained on policy - grounds, the pattern of substantial 
shortfalls seems to reflect mainly the projects which "were 
most easily postponed in the 1962/63 period of financial 
stringency. 
A principal reason for the shortfalls in both countries 
has been lack of finance (see Tables 10 and 11). In Uganda 
domestic sources have not yet reached the planned levels. 
After contributing very little in 1961/62, they rose sharply 
in 1962/63, and assuming the proposed £1 million transfer from 
recurrent tax revenues is carried out this year, will still 
leave a modest deficiency for 1963/64. foreign grants have 
actually been running.'above the planned levels. Foreign 
loans, on the other hand (interpreting the remainder of the 
financing as predominantly loans, on an expenditure rather than 
an approval basis), have fallen markedly below plan expect-
ations. Government spokesmen have expressed considerable 
disappointment at the delays in translating foreign countries' 
general willingness to assist the development effort Into agreed 
projects for which expenditures can proceed. However the 
responsibility for delays is allocated between foreign lenders 
and domestic project makers, it seems clear that difficulties 
in arranging foreign loans are a main source of past and 
possible future shortfalls. 
In Tanganyika domestic sources have been highly variable. 
After contributing much more than was planned In 1961/62, they 
fell off sharply in 1962/63 as a result of adverse domestic 
economic conditions. Now they are expected to increase 
dramatically in 1963/64, largely as a result of the boom in 
world sisal prices, which the government is tapping with a 
special tax. As In Uganda foreign grants have been running 
above the plan, but as a noticeably higher absolute level. 
Foreign loans, after pronounced delays" at the beginning, have 
been building up steadily. Thus the principal reason 
Tanganyika has been able to carry on a higher actual rate of 
development expenditures than Uganda is greater success (and 
this year greater good luck) in mobilizing domestic sources 
of finance. The two countries have fare more or less the 
same in obtaining foreign assistance, considering grants and 
loans together, but difficulties in arranging hoped-for 
foreign assistance have been a key constraint on the develop-
ment plans. 
Ill. Potential Fields ,of Plan Co-ordination '• 
Vfhat then can be suggested at this stage about promising 
fields for co-ordination of development plans in East Africa? 
As indicated- earlier, these suggestions should be treated more 
as hypotheses than as conclusions, but thejr may nonetheless be 
interesting to consider. They are based partly on the 
preceding description of current Uganda and Tanganyika plans, 
but even more on broader speculation and how planning might 
develop in the future. 'I will not try to'provide a listing 
which is complete in any sense, but simply to present three 
possibilities which seem to be especially attractive. 
/A 
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A. . Strategy and Method. 
If my prognosis that all three East African governments 
will attempt more comprehensive planning in the future is 
reliable, the"scope for co-ordination of strategy and method 
will be enlarged. One simple form is co-operation in 
carrying out some of the pieces of economic analysis needed 
for planning in all three countries, such as estimates of 
income elasticities of demand for different kinds of 
consumption goods. Other forms will suggest themselves 
as plans are extended to encompass economic policies now 
operated -through the common market. A systematic procedure 
for regular consultation on planning strategy and method,-
with a regional agency to co-ordinate and stimulate ideas, 
looks quite promising. 
B. Finance 
In view of the dominant financial constraint on current 
development plans in East Africa, it could be extremely 
helpful if plan co-ordination would permit more resources to 
be mobilized for development. One promising possibility 
appears to be joint application for foreign loans for projects 
in sectors which are sensible to justify on a regional basis. 
The recent success of discussions with foreign lenders about 
financing the current deficit and capital needs of the 
University of East Africa for the next triennium is a small 
but I believe significant illustration. Other sectors which 
would be- rational - and presumably attractive to foreign 
lenders - to consider on a regional basis are transportation, 
electric power, development banking, livestock, and 
agricultural research. 
Another important possibility is one which has held fire 
until the question of political federation is clarified -
an East African central bank. It seems apparent that if 
three independent national banks are created, with separate 
currencies, the prospect for continuation of a number of 
other features of present regional economic co-operation • 
would be markedly dimmed. A single central bank, however, 
assuming it would be operated to promote development more 
vigorously than the present currency board, would have to 
be subject to common policy. Development plans would have 
to be co-ordinated at least to the extent of their 
financing by borrowing directly from the central bank and 
by domestic borrowing supported and encouraged "by the bank. 
The essence of a more vigorous central bank policy would be 
push development expenditures financed by such borrowing 
until the real constraints in the balance of payments 
and in the supply of domestically produced goods became 
operative. -The strategy of pushing development expendi-
tures up to these real limits could only continue if all 
three countries co-operated, so that none imposed on the 
others the foreign exchange and inflation costs of its 
independent actions. 
0 Industrialization 
Industrialization policy is simultaneously the greatest 
present source of economic tension within the East African 
common market, and the greatest potential source of economic 
gain from closer East African integration. Given the 
present uncertainty.about political federation, it seems 
quite important'to consider'what are the most constructive 
and economically feasible next steps In Industrialization 
policy, to limit the risks of disruption of the common 
market and to seize as much as' possible of the potential 
/economic 
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economic gain. If full political federation is delayed or 
Indefinitely postponed, these next steps should make the 
common.market much more attractive and viable. If agreement 
on full political federation is reached promptly, they should 
provide the basis for assumption of federal responsibility. 
Thus both optimists and pessimists about federation might 
find common ground in certain next steps in co-ordinated 
industrial planning. 
Industrialization policy should be aimed not at one, but 
at two, objectives. These twin objectives are (a) to raise 
dramatically' the total rate of industrial investment in East 
Africa, and (b) to ensure that future Industrial investment 
is geographically distributed so that its benefits are divided 
approximately equally among Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika. 
It is essential to set the first objective because present 
industrialization is quite limited (about 100,000 employees 
in manufacturing), because.the rate of growth of manufacturing 
has been unhappily slow (gross product about annually 
1957-62, employment about - 2 f o ) , andbecause only raising total 
investment dramatically should significantly ease the strain of 
Its distribution amongthe three countries. It is essential 
to set the second objective ."because Kenya has moved well ahead 
of her two partners in the common market ( 4 5 o f manufacturing 
employment in 1962, 61fo of gross product in manufacturing, 
and of interterritorial exports of non-food manufactures), 
and because separate national efforts to influence the 
location of industrial investment are the most serious threat 
to continuation of even the present degree of economic 
co-operation. 
Six possible Instruments of industrialization policy can-
be usefully distinguished. (a) Promotion and persuasion is 
already being employed by each national government, and will 
surely continue. (b) Facilities and services designed to 
raise the profitability of new industrial projects to private 
firms take many forms, and are quite important. (c) Public 
enterprises have played a more prominent role in Uganda than 
in the other two countries, because of the UDC, but it seems 
likely and desirable that they will become a more important 
instrument in all three countries in the future. Public 
enterprises can accelerate industrialization by accepting 
greater risks in pioneering new branches of industry, or by 
accepting lower rates of financial profit in branches of 
industry which are especially stimulating to the economy, 
(d) Business tax credits are at present used in only a mild 
form in East Africa, and are traditionally kept essentially 
uniform by consultation amongthe three finance ministers. 
More powerful formulas can be designed to stimulate new and 
expanding firms, and these could also be used to influence 
location among the three countries. (e) Protection is 
already used rather energetically to protect domestic 
industries, again on a substantially uniform basis, except 
for the effect of customs drawbacks by the Individual 
governments. (f) Licensing can be employed for a limited 
number of scheduled products, but administration of licensing 
has become quite moribund. In particular it is difficult 
to employ licensing to influence industrial location because 
it is a negative rather than a positive control. 
A key next step In. industrialization polic.y might be to 
establish an East African agency to administer•the last three 
instruments - business tax credits, protection, and licensing -
according to agreed standards. The agreed standards should 
aim at the twin objectives of raising the total rate of 
industrial investment and ensuring approximately equal 
distribution of future benefits among Kenya, Uganda, and 
Tanganyika. To provide greater stimulus to total Investment, 
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the agency would need in particular much expanded powers to 
offer lousiness tax credits, as well as modified powers of 
protection and licensing. To ensure approximately equal 
distribution of future benefits, the agency would need to be 
authorized to provide supplementary inducements for investment 
in a lagging country, whenever its share of future benefits 
fell below a certain minimum. It seems practicable to 
devise objective criteria for this minimum,, subject to the 
exercise of some discretion by the agency would be the 
agent of the three governments in carrying out their agreed 
industrialization policy, using the three instruments placed 
at its disposal. The national governments would continue 
to employ the first three instruments listed above - promotion 
and persuasion, facilities and services, and public enter-
prises. They would of course also be the ultimate judges 
of whether the agency was performing satisfactorily. 
Table 15. 
Uganda Bevelopment Plan, 1961/62-1965/66: Composition 
"by Economic Sector and Administering Organization (£ th.) 
Central Govt. 







Agriculture ^ 4726 1016 3460 250 
Agric. Estates 7400 72t)0a 
Livestock 2381 409 1972 
Pishing 116 25' 91 
Forests 342 52 290 
Game & Tourism 603 51 251 500a 
Mining & Mapping 504 100 234 95 a 
Manufacturing 6800 4300a 
Commerce 800 100 700 a 
Credit 3300 3300 
Electric Power 4500 4500 
Roads 7180 7180 
Railway 3000 3000 
Airports 329 329 
Posts & Tel. 500 500 
Education 6673 (1127 ( 3 5l"k 5546 
Commun.Dev.& Labour 386 83b 386 
Health 2300 714^ 2300 
Information 689 42 g"5 689 
Defence & Police 3277 129613 3277 
Administration 2249 913^ 2249 
Local Govt. Services 7795 5795 2000 




TOTAL 67,850° 2,780 36,149 26,145 2, 775 
Eotes: 
a. Uganda Development Corp.projects. They total 15,370, including 
private participation of 2775. 
b. Recurrent costs to be covered in recurrent budget, not charged 
to development budget. Within education, recurrent costs of 
secondary expansion are charged to development. 
c. Total excludes recurrent costs indicated in note b, and 
hence differs from published total of 71,641, but is consistent 
with required development financing. 
Figures may not add exactly bec-ause of rounding. 
Source: Uganda Government, The First Five-Year Development Plan, 
1961/62 - 1965/66 (hereafter referred to as Plan). 
Table 15. 
Tanganyika Development Plan, 1961/62-1963/64: Composition 
by Economic- Sector and Administering Organization (<£ ths) 
n „ , Other Private Central Govt. Pu.-Diic Partici- • Total Recurr. Capital A c e n c i e s p ation 
Agriculture 3233 a 3233 
Agric.Estates 507 a 507 
Livestock 1232 a 1232 
Fishing 23 a 23 
Forests 533 a 533 
Game & Tourism 782 a 482 
Mining & Mapping 478 183 295 
Manufacturing 570 570 
Commerce 77 35 42 
Credit 50 50 
Electric Power 4878 1878 
Roads 5317 •5317 
Rai lway 2000 
Airports 205 205 
Posts & Tel. 440 
Education 3270 350 2920 
Commun. Dev. 229 81 148 
Health 954 954 
Information 151 151 
Defence & Police 2380 2380 
Administration 1100 1100 








30,820 649a 24,431° 2 , 440 '5, 300 
a. Breakdown between recurrent and capital costs to be 
charged to development budget not stated in plan. 
Agriculture excludes 250 charged to recurrent budget, 
b. Estimates of direct foreign lending to Development 
Corp. and of private participation in projects not 
stated. 
of contractor finance, not Roads figure includes 1150 
counted in plan. Hence total differs from published 
total by this amount. 
Estimated from IBRD mission report. 
Figures may not add exactly because of rounding. 
Source: Tanganyik a Government, Development Plan for Tanganyika, 
1961/62-1965/64 (hereafter refeTr"ed"*to~"as Tanganyika 
Plan). 
Table 15. 
Comparison of Composition of Uganda and Tanganyika 
Plans "by Economic Sector: Average Annual Expendi-
tures (£ th.) and Percentages 
Annual Expenditures Percentages 
Uganda T angan. Uganda Tang an." 
Agriculture 945 1078 7.0 10.5 
Agric. Estates 1480 169 10. 9 1.6 
Livestock 476 411 3.5 4.0 
Pishing 23 8 .2 .1 
Forests 68 178 .5 1.7 
Game & Tourism 121 2 61 . 9 2.5 
Mining & Mapping 101 159 .7 1.6 
Manufacturing 1360 190 10.0 1.8 
Commerce 160 26 1.2 .2 
Credit 660 17 4. 9 « 2 
Electric Power 900 1626 6.6 15.8 
Roads 1436 1772 10.6 17.2 
RailYiray 600 667 4.4 6.5 
Airports 66 68 .5 . 7 
Posts & Tel. 100 147 .7 1.4 
Education 1335 1090 9,8 10.6 
Commun. Dev. 
& La"bour 
77 76 .6 .7 
Health 460 318 3.4 3.1 
Information 138 50 1.0 .5 
Defence & Police 655 793 4. 8 7. 7 
Administration 450 367 3.3 3.6 
Local Gov. Serv. 1559 804 11. 5 7.8 
Reserve 400 - 2.9 -
TOTAL: 13j 570 10,273 100.0 100,0 
of which: 
Central Govt. 7, 786 8,360 
Other PUTD. : 
& Private 
j 5,784 1, 913 
Source: Uganda Plan; Tang anyika Plan 
Table 4. 
Comparison of Agriculture0'"Expenditures in Uganda and 
Tanganyika Plans: Average Annual Expenditures (£ th.) 
and Percentages 
Annual Expenditures Percentages 




98 ) 45 
2 1 . 0 ) 
6.5 ) 2.7 
General extension 118 „ R- R- d 355 7.8 21.2 
Veterinary serv. 56 67 3.7 4.0 
Water 135 220 8.9 13.1 
Range improvement - 67 - 4.0 
Stock improvement 19 - 1 . 5 -
Tsetse control 161 2 10.6 .1 
Q Equipment 174 46 11.5 2.7 
Training0 48 195 3.2 1 1 . 6 













Cooperatives 79 88 5.2 5.3 
Fishing 23 8 1. 5 .5 
Forests 68 178 4.5 10. 6 
Estates 1480 169 "b To 
TOTAL 2, 993 1, 843 "b To 
(excl„ estates) (1,513) (1,674) (100.0) (100.0) 
Notes: a. Agriculture here includes agricultural estates, livestock, 
forestry, and fishing. 
*b. Percentages calculated on total excluding estates. 
c. Includes expenditures for both crops and livestock. 
d. Figure for general extension assumes that recurrent 
costs in Agriculture portion of plan allocated to 
recurrent budget (250 over three years) are all at-
tributable to general extension. 
Source: Uganda Plan; Tanganyika Plan 
Table 5. 
Comparison of Education Expenditures in Uganda 
and T-anganyika. Plans: Average Annual Expendituree 
and Percentages, (£th.) 
Annual Expenditures3" Percent ages 
Uganda Tang anyika. Ug and a, T ang anyika. 
Primary 162 
Secondary 820 




170 12.8 15.6 
487 64.8 44.7 
88 8.6 8.1 
43 10.7 3.9 
2 83 1.4 26.0 
18 1.7 1.7 
TOTAL: 1,266 1,090 100.0 100.0 
Notes: a. Expenditures include additional recurrent costs 
in secondary schools in both countries. They 
exclude additional recurrent costs in teacher 
training and technical schools in both countries, 
though these are charged to the development 
budget in Uganda. 
b. Primary includes junior secondary in Uganda. 
c. Other is supervision and administration in 
Uganda, probation schools and library in Tanga-
nyika. 
Source: Uganda Plan; Tanganyika Plan,, 

Table 7. Expected Financing of Tanganyika Development Plan 
and Comparison with IBRD Mission Estimates (£.mil 
Plan IBRD: 
Central Public Central 
Govt.a Agencies Govt. 
Taxation ^ 1 0 ) 6 
Misc.domestic sources) * ) 
Domestic borrowing 4.0"13 1«5 
Operating surpluses - 2.4 -
(SUB-TOTAL (5.0) (2.1) 
Foreign grants 5.0a 4.6 
Foreign loans 2.7 a 5.0 
Private participation - .3 
Balance not covered ll„3a 11.3° 
TOTAL: 24.0b 5.7 18.0 
Notes: a. Expected central government finance is taken 
from the plan, with the breakdown between 
assured foreign grants and loans and balance 
not covered estimated from the plan text and 
the 1961/62 budget speech. The plan estimated 
that the balance would consist of 2.5 grants 
and 8.8 loans. 
b. Domestic borrowing and hence the total 
excludes contractor financing of road projects 
of 1.1. 
c. Includes additional foreign grants, foreign 
loans, and some further use of domestic source; 
Sources: Plan; Uganda Govt., Estimates of Expenditure 1965/64. Tanganyika Plan; Tanganyika Govt., Budget 
Speech, May 16, 1961; IBRD, The Economic 
Development of Tanganyika, Nov. 1960. 
T able ge 
Comparison of Planned, Actual, and Estimated Uganda 
Central Government Development Expenditure by Individual 


















Mineral & Water Res. 
(incl. irrigation, 
water for stock, 
wells for loc.gov. 
part administration) 
Works 
(incl. roads, airport, 
part administration) 
Education 





game & tourism) 
Internal Affairs 
(defence & police) 


















































TOTAL: 7,9l6a 4,824 5,700 9,730 
Hotes: 
a. Average is simply one-fifth of total expenditure in 
plan, after programs were reclassified by individual 
ministries. Total includes an estimated 130 each year 
for contract drilling for local governments; this 
service is included in reported annual expenditures 
by Ministry of Mineral & Water Resources but as a 
self-financing service was not counted in development 
plan. 
Sources: Plan; Uganda Govt., Estimates of Expenditure 1965/64. 
T at) 1 e 9. Comparison of Planned, Actual, and Estimated Tanganyika 
Central Government Development Expenditures by Economic 
Sectors (£ th.) 
Planned 
Average ' 1 9 6 2 / 6 3 
Annual 1961/62 R e v i s e d 







Agric. Estates 169 
Livestock 411 
Forests 178 
Game & Tourism 161 
Mining & Mapping 190 
Manufacturing,Com-
merce, & Credit 233 









































8, 360 7, 341 6,<©00 12,668 
(6,557) 
Notes a. Average 
plan. 
is simply one-third of total expenditure in 
b. Estimated actual figures fo 
and 1962/63 "by economic sec 
estimates for the two - y e a r 
in the 1963/64 budget, and 
1961/62 and initial estimat 
listed in the 1962/63 Budge 
1963/64 Budget. The two-ye 
with the reported totals fo 
1962/63 (revised estimate) 
Speech. 
r the two years 1961/62 
tor are the sum of revised 
period for projects listed 
revised estimates for 
es for 1962/63 for projects 
t but not listed in the 
ar total checks quite closely 
r 1961/62 (actual) and 
iven in the 1963/64 Budget 
Sources: Tanganyika P1an; Tanganyika Government, Estimates of 
Revenue and Expenditure, 196 3/64; Tanganyika Government 
Revenue and Expenditure, 1962/63; Tanganyika Estimates of _ 
Government, Budget Speech, June 11, 1965. 
Table jQ. 
Comparison of Expected, Actual, and Estimated Financing 
Uganda Central C-cwernnent Development Expenditures (£ th.) 
E xp e c t e d 






Finance a Actual Estimate Estimati 
T axation 200 144 19 1139^ 
Fees for services - 21 146 251 
Dividends & interest - 128 175 168 
Capital receipts 340 71 208 33 
Drawing down funds 780 - 1066 255 
Domestic borrowing 760 _c _c _c 
(SUB-TOTAL) (2100) (3 64) (1614) (184-6) 
Foreign grants 1020e 1198 1793 1557 
Foreign loans 1040e d d d 
Foreign assistance 1400 - — 1600 
in negotiation 
•P 
Balance not covered 2240 - - X
Unallocated residual - 3262 2292 2527 
TOTAL. 7, 800 4, 824 5, 700 7,530f 
Notes: 
a. Average is simply one-fifth of total expected financing 
in plan. 
b. Includes 1000 transfer from recurrent budget, dependent 
upon expected rise in revenue from export duties beyond 
£4 million, 
c. Amounts believed to be small, but some domestic borrov-ring 
may be included in unallocated residual. 
d. Included in unallocated residual. 
e. Plus part of foreign assistance in negotiation and 
perhaps part of balance not covered. 
f. Total for 1963/64 excludes 2200 balance not covered; 
thus financing falls short of initial estimate of 
expenditures by this amount. 
Sources: Plan; Uganda Government, Financial Summary and Revenue 
Estimates 1965/64; Uganda Government, Budget Speech, 
ilth June 1963. 
